A feature that imports an image, previews a link, or reads a document from a URL makes a network request from the application's infrastructure. The destination is selected through user input, but the connection originates from a server with its own network position.
Server-side request forgery, or SSRF, becomes possible when that feature can reach destinations outside its intended scope. The review needs to examine how the application validates and executes the request, including what happens after a redirect.
Validate the destination the server will reach
OWASP's SSRF guidance discusses allowlists, URL parsing, address validation, redirects, and network-layer controls. It distinguishes integrations with known destinations from features that legitimately retrieve broader internet content. The SSRF prevention guidance explains these design choices.
A supplier-logo importer that uses only approved storage domains can have a narrow destination policy. A general web-preview service needs a different one. Define the destinations the feature needs before choosing its fetch implementation.
Redirects and DNS can change the effective destination
A URL's first hostname may not be the final endpoint. Redirect handling can move the request, while DNS resolution determines the address actually contacted. Validation and connection logic need to use a consistent interpretation and enforce policy across the request path.
Network controls provide another boundary. A fetch worker can be restricted from reaching internal services and cloud metadata endpoints even if application-level validation has a defect. Record the actual outbound rules and any proxy that changes the connection path.
Test with controlled endpoints
Use endpoints owned for testing to return ordinary content, a redirect, a slow response, and a response larger than the supported limit. Include an agreed internal test destination that contains no sensitive information. The objective is to observe whether the feature follows its destination and resource policy.
Do not probe unrelated third-party infrastructure or retrieve real metadata credentials as a demonstration. A controlled marker endpoint can establish whether a prohibited connection occurred while keeping the test bounded and reproducible.
Review the response as untrusted content
Fetching a permitted URL does not make the returned file safe to parse or display. The importer still needs content-type handling, size limits, timeouts, and controls appropriate to its parser and rendering destination. A link-preview service can also expose response data through logs or cached previews.
Keep a trace of the submitted URL, validated destination, actual connection, processing result, and displayed content. Use it to locate failures and document how unsupported or unavailable imports are reported to users.
Sources
OWASP API7: Server Side Request Forgery. The supplier-logo importer is illustrative.